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ESSA Y
FEMINIST LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP ON RAPE:
A MATURING LOOK AT ONE FORM OF VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN
MORRISON TORREY*
It is a horrifying reality for women-we have more to fear
from those who say they love us than from strangers. Every
crime of violence against women-child sexual abuse,1 rape,2
domestic battery,3 even murder 4.- is more likely to be committed
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and the members of the Chicago Feminist Law Teachers and Friends Colloquium. Also,
my able research assistants, Heidi Lambros, Jennifer Beagle and Shawn Ryan, provided
substantial aid. Additionally, I thank Dean John Roberts and the Dean's Faculty Research
Fund of DePaul University College of Law for supporting my work on this essay.
1. According to Diana E.H. Russell, over one quarter of girls have experienced sexual
abuse before the age of 14, and over one third by the age of 18. DIANA E.H. RUSSELL,
THE SECRET TRAUMA: INCEST IN THE LIVES OF GIRLS AND WOMEN 312 (1986). Over 15% of
mep experienced some form of sexual abuse as children. WOMEN'S ACTION COALITION,
WAC STATS: THE FACTS ABOUT WOMEN 57 (1993) [hereinafter WAC STATSJ (citing The
National Resource Center on Child Sexual Abuse). According to a 1992 report, fewer
than 20% of children are abused by strangers. Id.
2. One out of every three women will be the victim of a sexual assault during her
lifetime. Sharing the Burden of Abuse: Men Take Steps Against Male Violence, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 17, 1990, at 81, col. 2 (citing Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics).
Approximately three out of four women who are raped knew their attacker. WAC STATS,
supra note 1, at 49 (citing NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER AND CRIME VICTIMS RESEARCH AND
TREATMENT CENTER, Rape in America, A Report to the Nation (1992), and The Mind of the
Rapist, NEWSWEEK, July, 23 1990 (quoting U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics)).
3. One out of every two married women will be beaten on at least one occasion by
her husband. Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law ofMisdemednor Domestic Violence, 19704990,
83 J. CiaM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46 (1992). Pregnancy is a high risk time for women - one
out of every six pregnant women is abused physically and/or sexually during pregnancy.
Judith McFarlane et al., Assessing for Abuse During Pregnancy: Severity and Frequency
of Injuries and Associated Entry into Prenatal Care, 267 JAMA 3176, 3177 (1992). The
male partner is the perpetrator in over 95% of domestic assaults. WAC STATS, supra
note 1, at 55 (citing Myths and Facts about Domestic Violence (adapted from Domestic
Violence Project, Ann Arbor, MI)).
4. Women commit less than 15% of the homicides in the U.S. WAC STATS, supra
note 1, at 56 (citing NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR THE DEFENSE OF BATTERED WOMEN,
PHILADELPHIA, Statistics, 1988 (1989)). Approximately nine out of ten murdered women
are murdered by men, half of them by a male partner. Id. (citing LORI HEISE, VIOLENCE
HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, CENTER FOR WOMEN'S GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, RUTGERS
UNIv., GENDER VIOLENCE AS HEALTH ISSUE (fact sheet) (1992)).
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by someone we know and trust than by a stranger. Complicating
the private aspects of violence against women is the nature of
the crime. Sex crimes are perceived and treated differently than
all other crimes of coercion and violence.5 Whereas it is probably
true that most, if not all, women fear being raped on a daily
basis (or at least think about preventive measures every day),6
the reality is that beatings by lovers are the greatest single
cause of injury to women in the United States-more than car
accidents, rapes and muggings combined. 7 This essay addresses
the evolution of feminist legal scholarship concerning rape.8
Beginning in the 1970s, spurred by Susan Brownmiller's land-
mark and widely-read book, Against Our Will: Men, Women and
Rape, women began to break the silence about rape.9 Brownmill-
er's work challenged traditional notions about rape, rapists, and
rape victims, and sparked new research and scholarship about
criminal sexual conduct. She critiqued all aspects of rape law,
including its definition (which excluded all sexual conduct except
penile-vaginal penetration),10 the marital rape exemption," the
requirement of resistance,' 2 the determination of nonconsent, 8
and numerous evidentiary issues.' 4 In addition, she was one of
the first feminist scholars to link pornography and prostitution
5. For example, Susan Estrich notes that nonconsent traditionally has been a required
element in several crimes, including theft, assault, battery, and trespass. SUSAN ESTRICH,
REAL RAPE 29 (1987). However, she states that rape is unique because it, and only it,
requires victims to demonstrate their nonconsent through physical resistance. Id.
6. MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR: THE SOCIAL COST
OF RAPE 8 (1989).
7. WAG STATS, supra note 1, at 55 (citing LYNNE SOWDER, Y CARE. CHICAGO, Facts
on Domestic Violence); HEISE, supra note 4. Domestic battery is the problem most women
face today.
8. For reasons of space limitations, this essay does not review the literature on the
relationship between domestic battery and rape. However, at least 60% of battered
women are sexually abused by their partners. WAC STATS, supra note 1, at 55 (citing
MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (adapted from Domestic Violence Project,
Ann Arbor, MI)).
9. Some of the other feminists writing about rape were DIANE E.H. RUSSELL, THE
POLITICS OF RAPE: THE VICTIM'S PERSPECTIVE (1974); ANDRA MEDEA & KATHLEEN THOMPSON,
AGAINST RAPE (1974); KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY (1979); and SUSAN
GRIFFIN, RAPE: THE POWER OF CONSCIOUSNESS (1979). As Griffin remarked in her classic
article, "the obscurity of rape in print exists in marked contrast to the frequency of rape
in reality...." Susan Griffin, Rape: 27e All-American Crime, RAMPARTS, Sept. 1971, at
26, 27.
10. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 424 (1975).
11. Id. at 427-28.
12. Id. at 430-32.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., id at 433 (questioning the relevancy of a victim's sexual history).
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with rape 6 and to discuss "date" or "acquaintance" rape. is As a
result of the questions raised by Brownmiller and other feminists,
people began to see rape not just as violence or sex, but as a
form of "mass terrorism" and an act of male domination over
women.
17
The most prominent response to this feminist critique was an
attempt to reform criminal rape law. 8 Early American courts
had required the "utmost resistance" in order to demonstrate
nonconsent in rape prosecutions. 19 This notion was derived from
the male judge's stereotype of the chaste and virtuous woman-
that she would do everything in her power, even die, rather than
be violated. Obviously, this notion was not formed by a realistic
view of a woman's relatively powerless position in society nor
through any evaluation of empirical data. Unfortunately, this
arcane view persisted deep into the 20th century when courts
continued to find that no rape was committed "unless the woman
oppose[d] the man to the utmost limit of her power.120
15. Id. at 438. However, other feminists have also addressed this connection. See, e.g.,
ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1979); CATHARINE A. MAC-
KINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987).
16. BROWNMILLER, supra note 10, at 450.
17. As one prominent author stated:
Rape is an act of aggression in which the victim is denied her self-determi-
nation. It is an act of violence which, if not actually followed by beatings or
murder, nevertheless always carries with it the threat of death. And finally,
rape is a form of mass terrorism, for the victims of rape are chosen
indiscriminately, but the propagandists for male supremacy broadcast that
it is women who cause rape by being unchaste or in the wrong place at the
wrong time-in essence, by behaving as though they were free.
Griffin, supra note 9, at 35.
18. One of the first contemporary law review articles taking rape seriously was
written by Vivian Berger in the late 1970s. See Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape
Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977) (specifically addressing issues about
rape shield laws). However, it is interesting to note that there was a proliferation of
student notes and comments on rape-related subjects during the 1970s. See generally id.
(referencing many student notes and comments).
19. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 106 N.W. 536 (1906) (reversing a rape
conviction because the victim had not adequately demonstrated her nonconsent and
stating: "Not only must there be entire absence of mental consent or assent, but there
must be the most vehement exercise of every physical means or faculty within the
woman's power to resist the penetration of her person, and this must be shown to persist
until the offense is consummated."); People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374 (1874).
20. People v. Hughes, 41 A.D.2d 333, 343, N.Y.S.2d 240, 242 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) ("It
is difficult to conclude that the complainant here waged a valiant struggle to uphold her
honor."). This is just one example of how courts apply myths instead of reality in rape
prosecutions. See generally Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and
the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1013 (1991).
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loreover, even though traditional notions of appropriate sex-
ual conduct were based on a moralistic view that the only
acceptable sexual conduct was that which occurred within the
legal confines of marriage,21 marriage itself did not protect women
from forced sex. Wives were presumed to consent; husbands had
an absolute right to have intercourse with their wives.22 By
defining rape as intercourse with a woman "not his wife," a
majority of states immunized husbands from prosecution as late
as 1977; other states simply relied on the common law exemp-
tion.P
Because liberal feminism was the dominant strain of the wom-
en's movement in the 1970s and 1980s, 24 the classic liberal ide-
ology of privacy, autonomy, and individual choice shaped emerging
rape reform. The influence of liberalism can be discerned in three
major changes: (1) the concept of "consent" became the essential
difference between lawful and unlawful conduct;25 (2) "sexual
coercion came to be viewed as individual and gender neutral
rather than institutional and sex specific," 2 thus remaining con-
21. See Martha Chamalias, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 781 (1988).
22. The source of the marital rape exemption is attributed to seventeenth century
jurist Lord Chief Justice Hale who opined that "the husband cannot be guilty of a rape
committed by himself upon his lawful wife for by their mutual matrimonial consent and
contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot
retract." MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CRowN 628 (R.H. Small ed.
1847). We can also thank Lord Chief Justice Hale for the prevailing homily that rape
charges are "easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the
party accused, tho never so innocent." Id. at 634.
23. ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 73. Some states even included cohabitants and former
spouses within the exemption. See Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the
Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REv. 45, 48 (1990). Even when states
eliminate the marital exemption, it is extremely difficult to obtain convictions. See MARY
BECKER, ET AL. CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN
SERIOUSLY 237-44 [hereinafter TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY]; Lisa D. Waggoner. New Mexico
Joins the Twentieth Century: The Repeal of the Marital Rape Exemption, 22 N.M. L. REv.
551 (1992); To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255 (1986).
24. See TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY, supra note 23, at 17-27 ("Liberal feminism became
dominant within the women's movement .... Liberalism, with its use of widely accepted
cultural norms such as individualism and its commitment to incremental change within
the existing order, was inevitably less threatening, and in some ways more effective than
radical or socialist feminism.").
25. Chamallas, supra note 21, at 782.
26. Jo Dixon, Feminist Reforms of Sexual Coercion Laws, in SEXUAL COERCION: A
SOURCEBOOK ON ITS NATURE, CAUSES, AND PREVENTION 161, 166 (Elizabeth Grauerholz and
Mary A. Koralewski eds., 1991). In reality, rape is not gender neutral; men commit rape.
According to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, in 1991 over 98/o of those persons
arrested for forcible rape were male; 99 0 of those convicted of forcible rape were male.
Uniform Crime Reports, FBI, U.S. Dept. of Justice (1991).
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sistent with the liberal emphasis on gender neutral humanism;
and (3) rape was characterized as "violence" as opposed to "sex"
with the adoption of the sexual assault and battery approach to
legislative reform.2
Responding to liberal feminist demands for reform, many states
made legislative changes in the common law of rape. Today,
almost all states have modified their rape statutes to some
degree. Reforms address concerns with evidentiary rules that
assume women to be liars, such as the requirement of independ-
ent evidence corroborating the victim's story,28 the limitation on
testimony concerning the victim's prior sexual history,2 the ab-
rogation of the fresh complaint doctrine m the prohibition on
cautionary jury instructions,3' the removal or creation of partial
marital exemptions,3 2 the modification (from "utmost" to "ear-
nest" to "reasonable") or elimination of standards of proof of
resistance,S3 the admission of expert testimony on Rape Trauma
Syndrome,3 and the renewal of the attempt to define "consent.""5
27. Dixon, supra note 26, at 166.
28. See, e.g., Karla Fischer, Defining the Boundaries of Admissible Expert Psychological
Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 696 (1989); Dawn M.
DuBois, A Matter'of Time: Evidence of a Victim's Prompt Complaint in New York, 53
BROOK. L. REV. 1087, 1098 (1988).
29. Commonly known as the "rape shield rule," the rule generally excludes testimony
about the victim's prior sexual activity unless such activity was with the defendant
(apparently assumed to be relevant as to consent) or the testimony explained the presence
of other physical evidence, such as semen. See, e.g., FED. R. Eviw. 412; TAING WOMEN
SERIOUSLY, supra note 23, at 232-37. However, many defense attorneys and others argue
that such a rule violates the defendant's 6th Amendment right of confrontation. See, e.g.,
Lara E. Simmons, Michigan v. Lucas: Failing to Define the State Interest in Rape Shield
Legislation, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1592 (1992); Peter M. Hazelton, Rape Shield Laws: Limits on
Zealous Advocacy, 19 Am. J. CanM. L. 35 (1991).
30. See Torrey, supra note 20, at 1041-45, 1066.
31. See id. at 104546.
32. See id. at 1063-64. Most states, although they have eliminated the marital exemp-
tion, accord a lower level of criminality to marital rapes. See Lisa Bernstein, Trends in
Marital Rape Laws: Progress or Facade?, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 273 (1992); TAKING
WOMEN SERIOUSLY, supra note 23, at 241-44.
33. Exactly how to determine "reasonableness" perpetuates the debate between ob-
jective and subjective standards. See TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY, supra note 23, at 758-67
(discussion of the "reasonable person" standard in the context of sexual harassment law).
34. See Torrey, supra note 20, at 1064-65.
35. Martha Chamallas, in her comprehensive article on the legal control of sexual
conduct, summarized how three states approached reform:
Landmark reform legislation in Michigan eliminated the consent issue alto-
gether and framed the crime of rape solely in terms of the type and amount
of force used by the defendant. Underlying the Michigan approach is a
presumption that certain types of coercive behavior (for example, where a
weapon is displayed) are per se unlawful. In such cases, there is no need to
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In 1974, Michigan adopted a criminal sexual conduct statute.36
This statute is probably the most complete reflection of the
liberal view of rape as a sex neutral crime of violence.
Radical feminists attacked these liberal reforms on multiple
levels. In the most abstract, radical feminists are concerned with
the power disparity between men and women and believe that
women's subordinate position is not solely a result of biased
governmental actions but also a result of the greater economic
and social power exerted by men in the private sphere.3 7 Because
liberalism is directed at limiting governmental intrusion in the
private sphere, radical feminists charge that these reforms are
incapable of correcting the oppression of women that occurs in
both the public and private spheres.
In addition, some feminists attacked the failure of liberal fem-
inism to address adequately racism and its impact on rape law.3
Kimberle Crenshaw articulates how the consideration of rape law
as a reflection of male control over female sexuality is an over-
simplification for women of color:
Rape statutes generally do not reflect, male control over
female sexuality, but white male regulation of white female
address the question of the subjective consent of the victim.
Other states have taken a different approach and have tried to rehabilitate
the concept of consent by defining consent from the victim's standpoint.
Wisconsin, for example, has narrowed the definition of consent to include
only those overt acts or words of the victim indicating freely given consent.
Under such a standard, a man is subject to criminal prosecution if he has
sexual intercourse with a passive woman without first securing her express
consent. Additionally, Illinois has demonstrated more trust in the credibility
and reliability of rape complainants by shifting the burden of production to
the defendant to present some evidence of consent before the issue is
interjected into the criminal prosecution. This represents an important change
from the traditional allocation which assigns the victim's lack of consent as
an element of the state's case.
Chamallas, supra note 21, at 799-800 (citations omitted).
36. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 750.520a (West 1991).
37. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance, in FEMINISM UN-
MODIFIED 32-45 (1987).
38. See, e.g., Kristin Bumimer, Rape as a Legal Symbo: An Essay on Sexual Violence
and Ratism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 75 (1987); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Ci. LEGAL F. 139, 157-60; Erin Edmonds,
Mapping the Terrain of Our Resistance: A White Feminist Perspective on the Enforcement
of Rape Law, 9 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 43 (1992); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism
in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585, 598-601 (1990); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Rape, Violence, and Women's Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359 (1993); Jennifer Wrig-
gins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 103 (1983).
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sexuality. Historically, there has been absolutely no institu-
tional effort to regulate Black female chastity. Courts in some
states had gone so far as to instruct juries that, unlike white
women, Black women were not presumed to be chaste. Also,
while it was true that the attempt to regulate the sexuality
of white women placed unchaste women outside the law's
protection, racism restored a fallen white woman's chastity
where the alleged assailant was a Black man. No such resto-
ration was available to Black women.
The singular focus on rape as a manifestation of male power
over female sexuality tends to eclipse the use of rape as a
weapon of racial terror. When Black women were raped by
white males, they were being raped not as women generally,
but as Black women specifically. Their femaleness made them
sexually vulnerable to racist domination, while their Blackness
effectively denied them any protection. This white male power
was reinforced by a judicial system in which the successful
conviction of a white man for raping a Black woman was
virtually unthinkable.39
This critique maintains the interconnectedness of sexism and
racism.
Due to the emerging importance of "consent" as part of the
liberal rape reform agenda, many feminist legal scholars targeted
this issue as a legal doctrine. In general, feminist critiques of
the legal definition of consent to sexual activity fall into three
categories: (1) true consent is not possible until women are no
longer subordinated by men; (2) consent is often presumed or
implied in non-stranger rape; and (3) prevalent sexual mythology
encourages men to disbelieve women when they say "no." The
difference between male and female experiences of "coercion"
exacerbates the problem- sometimes it may seem as if the sexes
are speaking different languages. Men tend to find coercion in
physical or economic pressure; however, women feel it emotion-
ally and psychologically as well. Martha Chamallas summarizes
the difficulty of this issue:
Perhaps more than in other areas of the law, the concept of
consent as it relates to sexual activities is a complicated notion.
Central to both the lay and legal notions of consent are con-
siderations other than the subjective desires of the parties.
Consent is a devilishly malleable term which may describe a
39. Crenshaw, supra note 38, at 157-59 (citation omitted).
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wide spectrum of responsive behavior, ranging from the mere
failure to engage in active resistance, to active participation
in and encouragement of another's initiatives. For that reason,
a decision as to what conduct constitutes consent in any par-
ticular context may mask value judgments implicit in the choice
of definition. A determination of sexual consent may, for ex-
ample, serve as a proxy for moral judgments about the behav-
ior of the parties or as a shorthand method for classifying
certain forms of sexual behavior as normal. Particularly in an
era greatly influenced by Freudian psychology, there was a
willingness to label sexual conduct as consensual, even if it
could be seen as fulfilling only the unconscious desires of the
actors. The Freudian concern for the ill effects of repression
also provided a theoretical justification for a loose operative
definition of consent.40
In her important book analyzing the law's treatment of non-
stranger rape, Susan Estrich agrees with the feminist assertion
that in a society where women have less power than men, viewing
a simple "yes" as consent is misguided:
I am quite certain that many women who say yes to men they
know, whether on dates or on the job, would say no if they
could. I have no doubt that women's silence sometimes is the
product not of passion and desire but of pressure and fear.
Yet if yes may often mean no, at least from a woman's per-
spective, it does not seem so much to ask men, and the law,
to respect the courage of the woman who does say no and to
take her at her word.... As for intent, unreasonableness as to
consent, understood to mean ignoring a woman's words, should
be sufficient for liability. Reasonable men should be held to
know that no means no; and unreasonable mistakes no matter
how honestly claimed, should not exculpate.'.
The feminist legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon also explores
the twin concepts of coercion and consent:
Consent is supposed to be women's form of control over inter-
course, different from but equal to the custom of male initia-
tive.... The law of rape presents consent as free exercise of
sexual choice under conditions of equality of power without
exposing the underlying structure of constraint and dispar-
40. Chamallas, supra note 21, at 795 (citations omitted).
41. ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 102-03.
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ity.... The law of rape divides women into spheres of consent
according to indices of relationship to men. Which category of
presumed consent a woman is in depends upon who she is
relative to a man who wants her, not what she says or does.
These categories tell men whom they can legally fuck, who is
open season and who is off limits, not how to listen to women.
The paradigm categories are the virginal daughter and other
young girls, with whom all sex is proscribed, and the whorelike
wives and prostitutes, with whom no sex is proscribed. Daugh-
ters may not consent; wives and prostitutes are assumed to,
and cannot but. [sic] Actual consent or nonconsent, far less
actual desire, is comparatively irrelevant. If rape laws existed
to enforce women's control over access to their sexuality, as
the consent defense implies, no would mean no, marital rape
would not be a widespread exception, and it would not be
effectively legal to rape a prostitute.0 2
In analyzing the consent problem, feminist political philosopher
Carol Pateman focuses on the evolution of consent theory.
43
Ironically, she finds that consent theorists have consistently
attempted to suppress the radical and subversive implications of
their own arguments: "writers on consent have been assisted in
this endeavour by the contemporary consensus that women, and
the relationship between the sexes, are of no special relevance
to political theory."' ' She writes that "[clonsent as ideology cannot
be distinguished from habitual acquiescence, assent, silent dis-
sent, submission or even enforced submission. Unless refusal of
consent or withdrawal of consent are real possibilities, we can
no longer speak of 'consent' in any genuine sense.' 4
The concept of consent is a thorny onef46 however, perhaps
more than any other single legal issue. The idea of consent
concerns fundamental problems of a society in which one group
dominates all others and defines legal doctrine according to its
own experiences ("neutrality").
42. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON. Rape: On Coercion and Consent, in TOWARD A FEMINIST
THEORY OF THE STATE 171, 174-75 (1989).
43. CAROL PATEMAN, Women and Consent, in THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY,
FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 71 (1989).
44. Id. at 72.
45. Id.
46. Another aspect to "consent" theory is the problem of statutory rape. See Michelle
Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 85 J.
CRM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 15 (1994); Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique
of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387 (1984).
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Radical feminists assert that it is a mistake to characterize
rape as violence rather than sexualized violence.47 As a practical
matter, prosecuting rapes that may lack physical violence, such
as date and marital rape, is more difficult under a characterization
of rape as simply violence. 8 Moreover, to categorize rape as a
violent assault obscures the unique meaning and understanding
of the indignity and harm of rape. Rape is a different and more
serious affront than assault. To label rape as merely assault
denies the reality of what rape, as opposed to other physical
assaults, does-rape is an objectification and denial of the basic
humanity of the victim.49
However, as Lynne Henderson has pointed out, "[t]he rape-as-
violence argument did succeed in disentangling rape from sex,
and therefore harm from pleasure, in the minds of many."' 5 This
separation of violence and sex is an attempt to analogize rape to
experiences that men can relate to, i.e., violence, because, after
all, to them sex is pleasure, not harm. Henderson also identified
the problematic aspect of speaking a language that men under-
stand: "The rape-as-violence argument leaves unchallenged most
male interpretations of heterosexual relations. In calling rape
'violence,' feminists have enabled many men to distinguish what
they have done from what rapists do, because they haven't caused
47. As Catharine MacKinnon so aptly puts it, "[wihen acts of dominance and submis-
sion, up to and including acts of violence, are experienced as sexually arousing, as sex
itself, that is what they are.... Violence is sex when it is practiced as sex." CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, Sexuality, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 6 (1987).
48. Dixon, supra note 26, at 170.
49. While I do not intend in any way to minimize the trauma and harm of physical
assaults, there are several aspects to rape that set it apart. For example, it remains
primarily a sex specific crime, i.e., women are raped by men. Because sexual activity is
involved, traditional notions of shame and guilt may result. There is a pervasive societal
belief that women "deserve" or "want" to be raped, or even enjoy it. This is manifested
in four rape myths: (1) only women with "bad" reputations are raped; (2) women are
prone to sexual fantasies; (3) women precipitate rape by their appearance and behavior;
and (4) women, motivated by revenge, blackmail, jealousy, guilt, or embarrassment, falsely
claim rape after consenting to sexual relations. See generally Torrey, supra note 20. The
physical consequences of rape also differ-there is a likelihood of pregnancy, sexually
transmitted diseases, and, now, AIDS. See generally Gerard Mantese et al., Medical and
Legal Aspects of Rape and Resistance, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 59 (1991). Even family members
and friends may suffer from the far-reaching effects of rape. Id.; see also Brande Stellings,
The Public Harm of Private Violence: Rape, Sex Discrimination and Citizenship, 28 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 185, 185 (1993) ("Rape profoundly alters women's sense of themselves
and tha world around them.... But unlike victims of other crimes, women who have
been raped cannot ever feel fully secure in their persons, because all of the precautions
in the world cannot eradicate the single biggest risk factor for rape-their femaleness.").
50. Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 LAW & PHIL. 127, 156 (1992).
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external physical damage that they can understand as violence." 51
Yet another stinging criticism is that many of these so-called
reforms, including the emphasis on consent, still focus attention
not on the actions of the perpetrator but on how the victim
behaved before, during, and after the alleged rape. 2 For example,
feminists arguing for the admission of expert testimony about
Rape Trauma Syndrome ("RTS") as evidence in rape prosecutions
supported a preoccupation about the actions of the victim.5
Ironically, we now know that the legislative changes have not
made any difference in the arrest, prosecution and conviction of
rapists. Empirical studies of rape reforms in Michigan,s' Wash-
ington,55 California,O Canada, 7 and six urban environmentss8 were
remarkably identical-there was virtually no change in the crim-
51. Id. at 157.
52. Dixon, supra note 26, at 163. Another aspect of this focus on the victim rather
than the perpetrator has been the discussion of "victim talk." See, e.g., Martha Minow,
Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411 (1993).
53. Rape Trauma Syndrome ["RTS"] testimony is sometimes admitted to explain that
the alleged victim reacted in ways consistent with someone suffering from RTS even
though her behavior may not conform to commonly held beliefs about how rape victims
react. See generally Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The
Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69
MINN. L. REV. 395 (1985).
54. See Julia Horney & Cassia Spohn, The Impact of Rape Reform Legislation, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (1989) (rape reform in Michigan had little impact on the way criminal
justice officials evaluated rape cases).
55. See Wallace D. Loh, The Impact of Common Law and Reform Rape Statutes on
Prosecution: An Empirical Study, 55 WASH. L. REv. 543, 618 (1980) ("Compared to the
common law statute, the findings clearly indicate that the Washington reform legislation
has not changed how prosecutors screen and file cases, with the consequence that the
total proportion of convictions remains the same.").
56. See Kenneth Polk, Rape Reform and Criminal Justice Processing, 31 CRIME &
DELINQ. 191 (1985) ("One goal of criminal law reform regarding rape has been to enhance
convictions. Data from California, in which several such reforms have been introduced,
indicate that between 1975 and 1982: (1) police clearance rates for rape have remained
relatively unchanged; (2) the rate of court filings for rape increased slightly; (3) the
probability of a conviction once a case reached court was relatively unchanged; but that
(4) there was a strong upward trend for cases of rape (and other serious felonies) to lead
to an institutional sentence.").
57. See Julian V. Roberts & Robert J. Gebotys, Reforming Rape Laws: Effects of
Legislative Change in Canada, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 555 (1992) (although there was a
significant increase in the number of rapes reported concurrent with passage of the
legislation, "the legislation has had no discernible effect upon the immediate criminal
justice response to reports of sexual aggression").
58. Cf. Julia Horney & Cassia Spohn, Rape Law Reform and Instrumental Change in
Six Urban Jurisdictions, 25 LAW & Soc'y REV. 117 (1991) (although the authors conclude
that rape reform had only a limited ability to affect case outcomes, their study did find
that rape victims were treated more sensitively).
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inal justice response following reform. The results indicated that
the only change was a significant increase in the number of
reports of rape concurrent with the passage of the legislation
and its attendant publicity; but that increase diminished over
time. Maybe there is no "model statute" solution to rape law,
because the problem is not the words of the law so much as our
interpretation of those words. 9 This interpretational problem is
rooted in a society in which one group (the perpetrators) has
economic, political, and social power over the other group (the
victims).
Radical feminists are now directing their efforts in a variety
of areas. Serious questions are being raised about essential dif-
ferences between stranger and non-stranger rapes and rapists.60
For instance, are the circumstances involved in the two types of
rape sufficiently variant to justify creating a new statute specif-
ically addressing non-stranger rape? Recently, feminists active
in the anti-rape movement have more directly challenged the
myths of male innocence and female guilt in their campaign
against "date rape," emphasizing that it is the man who rapes
and who is responsible for what he does with his penis.61 In order
to deal with the complex problems involved in non-stranger
sexual assault, Lynne Henderson urges us to develop a more
"positive" account of heterosexuality because without it feminism
will continue to have "difficulty maintaining a distinction between
rape and intercourse, between a profoundly damaging experience
and an immensely pleasurable one."62
Another indication of the heightened sophistication and candor
of feminist legal scholarship about rape is Mary Coombs' article
acknowledging the dangers of exploring, through telling our
59. ESTRICH, supra note 5, at 58.
60. See, e.g., SALLY K. WARD ET AL., ACQUAINTANCE AND DATE RAPE: AN ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY (1994); see also, Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 L. & PHIL.
217 (1989).
61. Henderson, supra note 50, at 159; see, e.g.. Karen M. Kramer, Rule by Myth: The
Social and Legal Dynamics Governing Alcohol-Related Acquaintance Rapes, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 115 (1994).
62. Henderson, supra note 50, at 163. Stephen Schulhofer argues in support of adopting
a theory of "sexual autonomy" in rape law. Stephen Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy
Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11 LAW & PHIL. 35, 58 (1992). Donald A. Dripps urges
us to think of sex as a commodity and therefore rape as theft. Donald A. Dripps, Beyond
Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780 (1992). But see Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A
Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUm. L. REV. 1442 (1993); Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape,
Violence, and Women's Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359 (1993). For a powerful
refutation of the theory of "sex as contract," see Martha A. Fineman, A Legal (and
Otherwise) Realist Response to 'Sex As Contract,' 4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 128 (1994).
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stories, what we consider sexual violation as opposed to sexual
pleasure:
As part of the long-term struggle for understanding and trans-
formation, we need to examine our own experiences of sexu-
ality and the social and psychological dynamics of those
experiences. The world is not divided neatly into good sex, on
the one hand, and rape and violation on the other. There are
situations that fit into neither category: endured sex; "bad"
sex; degrading, unpleasant, and offensive encounters; sex when
one participant wants to please the other or is willing to
tolerate sex for the partner's good qualities. Women need to
explore the full range of arguably sexual activities and their
reactions to them.P
As Kim Lane Scheppele explains, "[w]hat is needed still is the
re-vision of rape, learning to see differently in law how men and
women communicate and interact."6'
We are learning more and more from listening to what the
social and behavioral sciences can tell us about rape, rapists, and
rape victims. 65 Many feminists are urging us to use this infor-
mation to dispel the many myths commonly held about rape that
serve to punish women who do not conform to those myths.66
Because these sciences seem to suggest that we can "debrief'
commonly held false beliefs and stereotypes about rape,6 7 femi-
nists have initiated educational projects. For instance, there are
now judicial and prosecutorial education projects geared to edu-
cating the decisionmakers in the criminal justice system.6 Edu-
cation offers a potential solution to ending the epidemic of violence
against women that reform of the justice system has failed to
provide.
63. Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 TE x. J. WOMEN & L. 277, 311 (1993)
(citations omitted).
64. Kim L. Scheppele, The Re-Vision of Rape Law, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 1095, 1114 (1987)
(book review of ESTRICH, REAL RAPE).
65. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Lonsway & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Rape Myths In Review, 18
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 133 (1994); articles cited in Torrey, supra note 20.
66. See, e.g., Torrey, supra, note 20; Sue A. Gregory, Rape and Child Sexual Assault:
Dispelling the Myths, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 157 (1992).
67. See, e.g., Neil M. Malamuth & James V.P. Check, Debriefing Effectiveness Following
Exposure to Pornographic Rape Depictions, 20 J. SEX RES. 1 (1984).
68. The National Judicial Education Project focuses on this problem. See, e.g., Lynn
H. Schafran, Women in the Criminal Justice System: Writing and Reading About Rape: A
Primer, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 979 (1993); Lynn H. Schafran, Maiming the Soul: Judges,
Sentencing and the Myth of the Nonviolent Rapist, 20 FORDHAM URS. L.J. 439 (1993).
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Feminist legal scholarship has matured to such a degree that
we can now publicly comment on the failures of the past. For
example, the reliance upon RTS testimony has been roundly
criticized by Susan Stefan not just because it can be manipulated
by defense attorneys to attack the credibility of individual victims
who do not suffer from the documented forms of RTS,8 9 but'
because (1) it suggests that there is a right and wrong way to
react to rape, thus delegitimizing personal reactions and resulting
in labelling the victims rather than the perpetrators as "sick;"
and (2) it removes the issue of rape from the political sphere,
suggesting that the victims rather than society are sick.70
As part of their concern that rape is not taken seriously,
several feminist scholars analyzed the treatment of rape in crim-
inal law casebooks 71 and treatises,72 as well as in the classroom.73
But feminist law school casebooks, such as Cases- and Materials
on Feminist Jurisprudence: Taking Women Seriously,74 are begin-
ning to address not just the technical criminal law aspects of
rape but also other issues of importance, such as the effects of
violence against women, the viability of civil as opposed to
criminal actions against rapists, and even ways to stop a rape
attempt. 75
69. This is one manifestation of a phenomenon we have come to know as "equality
with a vengence," e.g., the proliferation of reverse discrimination lawsuits that has
resulted in the elimination of alimony and maternal preferences in custody disputes.
70. See generally Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psy-
chiatric Labeling, and Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1271 (1994).
71. Nancy S. Erickson, Final Report: 'Sex Bias in the Teaching of Criminal Law', 42
RUTGERS L. REV. 309 (1990); Nancy S. Erickson, Sex Bias in Law School Courses: Some
Common Issues, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 101 (1988); Nancy S. Erickson, Legal Education: The
Last Academic Bastion of Sex Bias?, 10 NOVA L.J. 457 (1986).
72. Mary I. Coombs, Crime in the Stacks, or A Tale of a Text: A Feminist Response to
a Criminal Law Textbook, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 117 (1988).
73. See, e.g., Nancy S. Erickson & Mary Ann Lamanna, Sex-Bias Topics in the Criminal
Law Course: A Survey of Criminal Law Professors, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 189, 208 (1990)
(even though rape is one of the most frequently included topics in the criminal law course,
i.e., elements of the crime were covered by 86.3% of the professors responding to the
survey, on average the teachers spent just over one and one-half hours on the topic); see
also Susan Estrich, Teaching Rape Law, 102 YALE L.J. 509 (1992); James J. Tomkovicz,
On Teaching Rape: Reasons, Risks, and Rewards, 102 YALE L.J. 481 (1992).
74. TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY, supra note 23; see also BEVERLY BALOS & MARY L.
FELLOWS, LAW AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: CASES AND MATERIALS ON SYSTEMS OF
OPPRESSION (1994); KATHARINE T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COM-
MENTARY (1993); MARY J. FRUG. WOMEN AND THE LAW (1992).
75. See, e.g., PAULINE B. BART & PATRICIA H. O'BRIEN, STOPPING RAPE: SUCCESSFUL
SURVIVAL STRATEGIES (1985) (analysis of 94 interviews with women 18 or older who had
been attacked and avoided being raped (51) or had been raped (43) in the two years prior
to the interviews), reprinted in part in TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY, supra note 23, at 251-
54.
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Lest I appear too optimistic, let me finish with a quotation
from Susan Estrich's article, Sex at Work, in which she notes
that all of the discriminatory aspects of rape law have now been
incorporated into sexual harassment doctrine:
In the last analysis, reform failed not because feminists are
not good at writing statutes, but because if there is one area
of social behavior where sexism is entrenched in law-one
realm where traditional male prerogatives are most protected,
male power most jealously preserved, and female power most
jealously limited-it is in the area of sex itself, even forced
sex. Guns and gangs may be recognized as criminal, but to go
beyond that is to enter a man's protected preserve, in life and
in law. In life, this male domain is protected by the wielding
of real power-economic, physical, psychological, and emo-
tional. In law, it is protected by doctrines of consent, corrob-
oration, fresh complaint, and provocation. It is protected by
manipulating these doctrines to embrace female stereotypes
which real women cannot meet. It is protected by a definition
of reasonableness that pits this woman against that ideal, that
pits one woman against the rest. It is protected by punishing
women who are weak for their weakness, and women who are
exceptional for their strength. It is protected, in short, by the
operation of sexism in the law.78
Regardless of doctrinal or philosophical differences among femi-
nists, one thing is clear: women will never be free until they are
free from sexual aggression.
76. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 814-15 (1991).
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